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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20040969-CA

vs.
GARY RANDALL WHETTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for ten counts of Communications Fraud, seconddegree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (West 2004), and three
counts of Unlawful Dealing by a Fiduciary, second-degree felonies, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN. §

76-6-513(2) (West 2004), in the Third District Court, the Honorable

Scott M. Hadley presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2003).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly interpret the "Concurrent or Consecutive
Sentences" Statute to allow for multiple consecutive one-to-fifteen year sentences,
where the statute specifically authorizes the trial court to sentence defendant to
multiple consecutive one-to-fifteen year sentences?

Defendant made no timely objection to the trial court's sentence or imposition of
consecutive terms. Because defendant has not argued plain error or ineffective assistance
of counsel, and in fact invited any error the trial court may have made, his claim may not
now be reviewed. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining
to review claim of unpreserved error absent request for plain error review); see also State
v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 718 (Utah App. 1997).
Had defendant properly preserved the argument for appeal, this Court would review
the trial court's application of the statute in question for correctness. State v. Ostler, 2001
UT 68, Tf 5, 31 P.3d 528. Although defendant argues that the standard of review is one of
abuse of discretion, Br. Aplt. at 2, the issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly
interpreted the statute in question. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of
law reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation.
Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, f 5, 534 Utah Adv. Rep. 9.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The full text of Utah Const. Art. 7, § 12 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401, as cited
in the body of this brief, is included in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 18, 2003, defendant was charged by Information with twenty counts of
Communications Fraud, second degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 7610-1801 (West 2004), two counts of Issuing a Bad Check, second degree felonies, in
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After hearing from both the State and the defense as to what they believed was a
proportionate sentence to the crimes pled, R. 244: 31-32, the court sentenced defendant
to 13 indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen years and ordered him to pay restitution. R.
244: 33. Counts one through six were run consecutively; the remaining counts were run
concurrently. R. 244: 33. The court stated, "In my mind, that would be a minimum
sentence then of six years, maximum of 30 years." R. 244: 33.
At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court again requested if there was anything
else from the State or defense. R. 244: 36. The only issue the defense inquired into at
that time was whether defendant should be given credit for time served. R. 244: 36-37.
The court stated that he should be given credit for time served. R. 244: 37.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Counts 1 through 12
The Nordic Valley Ski Resort was owned by a company called Ski Associates.
R.243:23. Nordic Valley had been for sale for several years when, in November, 2001,
defendant approached the board of Ski Associates and tendered a check for $4.5 million
in attempt to purchase Nordic Valley Ski Resort. R.243:28. The Ski Associates Board

1

Defendant pled guilty after a partial preliminary hearing. Evidence was presented on
counts 1 through 15, but not on counts 16 through 31, for which defendant waived a
preliminary hearing. See R.243:120. Accordingly, with respect to counts 1 through 15,
this Statement of Facts relies on evidence presented at the preliminary hearing; with
respect to counts 16 through 31, this Statement of Facts relies on the prosecutor's factual
representations in his opening statement at the preliminary hearing.
4
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2002, defendant kept all proceeds that were generated by Nordic Valley. R.243:33.
Moreover, defendant failed to pay thousands of dollars worth of billing incurred during
this time. R.243:38-40. Counts one through twelve are related to defendant's activities
with Nordic Valley. R.243:9.
Counts 13 and 14
Also about this time, defendant hired McNeely to do computer work on a contract
basis. R.243:51-52. Defendant wrote McNeely a check for $100,000 (as partial payment
for services). R.243:52. This check was returned for insufficient funds. R. 243:53. Counts
thirteen and fourteen, Communications Fraud and Issuing a Bad Check, concern these
transactions. R. 243:10.
Count 15
While operating Nordic Valley, defendant engaged Jack Johnson Company
("Company") to develop and expand the ski resort. R.243:103-04.

The Company

completed approximately $600,000 worth of services and development. R.243:112.
Defendant gave the Company a check for $97,500 that was returned due to insufficient
funds. R. 243:113. Count fifteen of the Information concerns these activities.
Counts 16 through 31
The remaining counts concern events that occurred about the same time as the
aforementioned events. R. 243:11 -12,244:16. Defendant was soliciting investors for an
Internet company named "Play-It." R. 243:13-15. He received approximately $487,000

6

in investment money, which he spent on purchases unrelated to Play-It. R. 243:16. In
August, 2002, defendant produced a licensing agreement between Play-It and Cyber Link
Systems, which he represented to be a subsidiary of Direct TV. Direct TV does not have
a subsidiary called Cyber Link Systems, and the licensing agreement was fabricated by
defendant R. 243:16.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges the trial court's decision to run his sentences consecutively.
In effect he argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the statute limiting the time
an inmate can serve to 30 years. However, defendant invited any error by concurring
below with the trial judge's interpretation of the consecutive sentence statute.
Consequently, even if the court committed plain error, which it did not, defendant cannot
press his claim on appeal.
Even if defendant had not invited the court's ruling below, his argument would fail.
His claim that the imposition of six indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen equates to a
possible 90 years in prison is incorrect. Under the sentencing statute, the imposition of
six consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms cannot result in defendant's actually serving
more than thirty years.
Defendant also argues that the broad discretion given to the Board allows it to
ignore the sentencing statute. The Board has no such authority. It is bound by the Utah

7

Constitution and statutory law which limits its authority. As a result, the Board has no
authority to hold defendant more than thirty years.
Lastly, defendant urges this Court to overrule its own prior case law on the ground
that the sentencing statute is ambiguous. On the contrary, the statute is clear and
unambiguous and this Court has correctly interpreted the statute in its prior opinions.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT SENTENCED
DEFENDANT TO SIX CONSECUTIVE ONE-TO-FIFTEEN YEAR
TERMS.
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly interpreted UTAH CODE ANN. § 763-401 (West 2004) by sentencing him to more than two consecutive one-to-fifteen year
terms. Br. Aplt. at 12-13. Specifically, defendant asserts that a trial court is limited to
sentencing any defendant who is not eligible for a life sentence to two one-to-fifteen year
terms, since any more would exceed the thirty-year statutory maximum. Br. Aplt. at 13.
Defendant also asserts that since the Board has "exclusive authority" to determine
how long any given individual will actually serve in prison, it is possible that an individual
could serve longer than thirty years in prison if the sentence imposed exceeds thirty years,
despite the statute's 30-year limit on the maximum term served. Br. Aplt. at 13, 15.
Finally, defendant urges this Court "to overrule its own prior case law." Br. Aplt.
at 16.

8

A*

Defendant Invited Any Error in the Trial Court's Imposition of
Consecutive Terms.

Where defense counsel affirmatively waives an objection below, the appellate court
will decline to address that argument on appeal. State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 718 (Utah
App. 1997) (addressing defense counsel's statement that he had no objection to the jury
seeing a videotape of interview with child sexual abuse victim). Affirmative waiver is
one form of invited error. A party cannot raise a claim on appeal where the party, through
counsel, consciously refrained from objecting or led the trial court into error below. State
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). Moreover, "where invited error butts up
against manifest injustice [or plain error], the invited error rule prevails." State v. Perdue,
813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991).
Here, defendant's statement of preservation is as follows: "The issue was preserved
when Defendant's attorney asked the trial judge to sentence defendant to two consecutive
sentences." Br. Aplt. at 2. However, after the defense requested the trial court to sentence
defendant to two consecutive sentences, the trial judge, the prosecution, and the defense
counsel all discussed the sentencing statute and achieved a consensus as to its
interpretation. When the court interpreted the statute as authorizing it to sentence
defendant to consecutive terms exceeding 30 years, the court asked defense counsel
whether he had anything further to say about that interpretation. R. 244: 31. Defense
counsel responded, "No, your Honor." R. 244: 31. Thus, defendant acquiesced in the trial

9

court's interpretation and application of the statute. Any possible error was accordingly
invited. This Court should accordingly reject the claim on appeal.
B.

The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Statute was Correct When
it Found that it was Authorized to Sentence Defendant to Multiple
Consecutive One-to-Fifteen Year Terms.

In any event, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is correct. Although
defendant argues that the standard of review is one of abuse of discretion, Br. Aplt. at 2,
the sole issue is whether the trial court properly interpreted the statute in question.
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed for correctness, giving
no deference to the trial court's interpretation. Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, f 5,
534 Utah Adv. Rep. 9.
Section 76-3-40l(8)(a) applies to sentences other than death or life imprisonment.
It limits the Board of Pardons and Paroles in cases where the aggregate maximum term
of consecutive sentences exceeds thirty years: "if the aggregate maximum term exceeds
the 30-year limitation, then the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years." In order
to make legislative intent abundantly clear, the statute goes on to provide that: "[t]his
section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive
sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but
only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-401(10) (West 2004).
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The statutory intent and operation are clear. Once the court imposes consecutive
sentences (which may exceed thirty years in maximum terms), a defendant may not
actually be incarcerated by the Board for more than thirty years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 763-401(6)(a) (West 2004). Therefore, while a trial court may sentence a defendant to any
number of multiple consecutive sentences of one-to-fifteen years, the actual time of
incarceration imposed by the Board may not exceed thirty years.
The trial court understood the practical effect of the statute when it sentenced
defendant to six consecutive sentences of one-to-fifteen years. It stated, "In my mind, that
would be a minimum sentence then of six years, maximum 30 years." R. 244: 33. The
prosecution further reiterated this point: "Your Honor, I think the way . . . this ought to
be sentenced is you sentence [defendant] to three 1 to 15s consecutive and let the Board
make a determination as to how the statute is applied. You don't need to say 3 to 30. You
say three consecutive 1 to 15s." R. 244:31. Defendant concurred with this interpretation.
&>e R. 244: 31.
Defendant has not attacked the sentence as disproportionate or illegal except insofar
as he claims it violates the 30-year statutory limit. Because the trial court's interpretation
of the statute was correct, defendant's claim fails on the merits.

11

C.

The Board of Pardons and Parole Lacks Discretion to Incarcerate
a Felon for More Than Thirty Years When the Sentence Imposed
is Six One-to-Fifteen Year Terms.

Defendant asserts that the statute does not limit the Board's discretion as to how
long it may incarcerate any given prisoner. Br. Aplt. at 13. He argues that the Board has
unfettered discretion to determine how long an individual will actually serve in prison.
Br. Aplt. at 14. This claim also fails.
Under Utah's sentencing regimen, the court sentences a defendant to an
indeterminate statutory sentence, but the Board of Pardons determines the actual length
of time served. Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994). Although the Board
has wide discretion to determine an individual's length of incarceration, that discretion is
limited by the Utah Constitution and by statute.

See UTAH CONST. Art. 7. § 12.

According to the Constitution, the Board has discretion to "grant parole, remit fines,
forfeitures, restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant pardons subject to
regulations as provided by statute." Id. at §12(2)(a) (emphasis added).

Thus,

notwithstanding the Board's authority to determine defendant's actual time of
incarceration, its authority is limited by statute. Consequently, the Board may not
incarcerate an individual longer than the prescribed statutory period—in this case, 30
years. Despite defendant's assertion that the Board has broad discretion, there is no
indication that the Board will defy statutory law by holding defendant more than thirty
years as defendant speculates.

12

Defendant cites case law indicating that the Board has wide authority. Preece v.
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).
Nevertheless, neither case deals with the issue at hand. Preece held that the Board may
extend a prisoner's period of incarceration so long as it falls within the statutory range.
Preece, 886 P.2d at 512. Schreuder held that a trial court is not authorized to reduce a
defendant's sentence to give credit for time served once the sentence has already been
imposed—at that time, the Board has such authority. Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 277. Neither
case applies to the instant case, where the Board's authority is specifically limited by
statute.
D.

This Court has Correctly Determined this Issue Twice Before and
Should Decline Defendant's Invitation to Overrule its Own Prior
Case Law,

In State v. Horton, this Court held that section 76-3-401 does not preclude a trial
court from imposing consecutive sentences, but rather is a limitation on the Board of
Pardons and Parole and simply operates to limit the amount of time a prisoner can actually
serve for consecutive sentences. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 715 (Utah App. 1993);
see also State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1993) ("[t]his construction of the
statute is consistent with the purpose of a statute limiting consecutive sentences, which is
to guard against oppressive and inequitably long sentences."). In bothHorton and Swapp,
this Court held that the limitation of the statute does not preclude the trial court from
imposing consecutive sentences totaling more than 30 years; rather, it prevents the Board

13

from actually holding a prisoner for more than 30 yezrsHorton, 848 P.2d at 715, Swapp,
808 P.2d at 121-22.
Although the trial court in Swapp correctly interpreted the sentencing statute and its
interpretation was upheld on appeal, section 76-3-401 was changed as a result of some
confusion in the Swapp sentencing hearing as to whether the trial court was limited to two
consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms. The 1989 amendment to the statute clarified the
intent of the Legislature, expressly providing that it does not limit the trial judge's
imposition of sentence to only two consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms. S.B. 212, 48th
Leg., Gen. Session, 1989 Utah Laws 181.
In essence, defendant is not only requesting that this Court overrule its own long
established precedent, he is additionally asking this Court to disregard the statute's plain
language and clear legislative intent.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. Because
this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would make no useful
addition to the body of Utah law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendant's consecutive terms of incarceration should be
affirmed.
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Addendum A

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-3-401.
[Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations — Definition]
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any
other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(I) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum

sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.

Utah Const. Art. 7 Sec. 12.
[Board of Pardons and Parole—Appointment—Powers and procedures— Governor's
powers and duties—Legislature's powers]
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall appoint the members of
the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided by statute.

(2)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other conditions as provided
by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures, and restitution orders, commute
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and
impeachments, subject to regulations as provided by statute.
1. (b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be remitted and a commutation, parole, or
pardon may not be granted except after a full hearing before the board, in open session, and
after previous notice of the time and place of the hearing has been given.
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons therefor in each case, and the
dissent of any member who may disagree shall be recorded and filed as provided by statute with
all papers used upon the hearing.
(3)(a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state except treason or conviction on impeachment. These respites
or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the board. At that session, the
board shall continue or determine the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or
pardon the offense as provided in this section.

(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may suspend execution of the
sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next annual general session,
when the Legislature shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution. If
the Legislature takes no action on the case before adjournment of that session, the
sentence shall be executed.
Laws 1979, S.J.R. 7; Laws 1992, S.J.R. 8, § 6, adopted at election Nov. 3, 1992, eff.
Jan. 1993.

